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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—NIGHTTIME EXECUTION: THE
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT FINDS WARRANT
LACKING SEPARATE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
NIGHTTIME EXECUTION
State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, 833 N.W.2D 15
ABSTRACT
In State v. Holly, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the
good-faith exception and inevitable discovery doctrine as exceptions to an
“anytime” warrant found to be lacking separate probable cause for
nighttime execution. Holly alleged the warrant affidavit lacked probable
cause, making the search of his vehicle and residence illegal. The court
reversed the defendant’s criminal judgments that were based on evidence
found in his residence, but affirmed criminal judgments based on the
evidence found in the defendant’s vehicle. In finding an invalid search of
the appellant’s home, but a valid search of the car in the driveway, the
North Dakota Supreme Court altered what constitutes a “reasonable” search
and seizure within the meaning of the North Dakota Constitution.
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FACTS

On February 7, 2011, law enforcement received information from
Micah Sesseman that John Holly, the informant’s roommate, would be
transporting marijuana and prescription drugs from Whitefish, Montana to
their shared residence in Minot, North Dakota.1 Sesseman informed law
enforcement that Holly would be traveling in a white Ford Ranger with
Texas license plates, that the vehicle would be driven by his girlfriend, a
third roommate, and that Holly and his girlfriend would arrive in Minot the

1. State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, ¶ 2, 833 N.W.2d 15, 20.
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following evening.2 On February 8, Officer Graham visited the defendant’s
residence to meet with Sesseman.3 While Officer Graham was at the shared
residence, Sesseman entered Holly’s bedroom.4 From where Officer
Graham stood in the living room, he observed a glass smoking device on
Holly’s dresser.5
After visiting Sesseman, Officer Graham sought a search warrant for
Holly’s vehicle and residence.6 The magistrate issued a warrant allowing
law enforcement to search the vehicle and residence during the daytime.7
At the request of Officer Graham, the warrant was later modified, with
judicial approval, to “anytime” and was executed on February 8, 2011 at
10:14 p.m.8 From Holly’s vehicle, the officers seized two plastic bags of
marijuana, one plastic bag of approximately twenty-six pills of
Clonazepam,9 a plastic bag of Psilocyn,10 hallucinogenic mushrooms, and
one glass smoking device.11 From Holly’s residence, the officers seized a
plastic bag containing aluminum foil that contained Testosterone
Propionate,12 a digital scale with marijuana residue, a plastic tub containing
various size plastic bags and marijuana residue, a glass smoking device, and
one metal smoking device.13
Holly moved to suppress the evidence seized in his home and residence
based on a lack of probable cause.14 Specifically, the defendant alleged the
warrant affidavit did not establish the reliability of the informant or the
separate probable cause required for the issuance of an “anytime” warrant.15
Holly also argued that law enforcement’s observation of a glass smoking
device in his bedroom constituted an illegal search.16 Additionally, Holly
moved to suppress the evidence based on the warrant affidavit’s reference

2. Id.
3. Id. ¶ 3.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. ¶ 4.
7. Id.
8. Id. ¶ 5, 833 N.W.2d at 21.
9. Clonazepam is a benzodiazepine prescription medication that decreases abnormal
electrical activity in the brain and is often used to treat seizures and panic attacks.
10. A hallucinogenic compound generally found in psychedelic mushrooms.
11. Holly, ¶ 5, 833 N.W.2d at 21.
12. Testosterone Propionate is a steroid that increases testosterone levels in the body and is
typically prescribed for individuals who are unable to produce necessary levels of testosterone on
their own.
13. Holly, ¶ 5, 833 N.W.2d at 21.
14. Id. ¶ 6, 833 N.W.2d at 22.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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to “six pounds” of marijuana.17 The motion argued Officer Graham either
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, referenced the
marijuana in an attempt to mislead the magistrate when obtaining the search
warrant.18 The trial court denied the motion to suppress.19 The trial court
concluded that Officer Graham did mislead the magistrate even though the
information was later found to be incorrect.20 The trial court found Holly
guilty of six counts of possession of controlled substances21 and possession
of drug paraphernalia.22 While the court found Holly not guilty on the
charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, it did find Holly
guilty of a lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled
substance—- marijuana greater than one ounce.23 On appeal, Holly argued
the trial court erred in finding him guilty of a lesser-included offense,
denying his motions to suppress, and denying his motion for a judgment of
acquittal.24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution, which includes
language modeled after the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. 25
As part of this protection, a search conducted without a warrant is presumed
to be invalid.26 To obtain a search warrant, law enforcement officers must
establish probable cause.27 In North Dakota, probable cause exists where

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Specifically, the trial court found Holly guilty of: (1) possession of a schedule III
controlled substance greater than one ounce; (2) possession of a schedule III controlled substance;
(3) possession of drug paraphernalia, other than marijuana; (4) possession of drug paraphernalia,
marijuana; (5) possession of Psilocyn; (6) possession of a schedule IV controlled substance; and
(7) possession of drug paraphernalia, other than marijuana. Id. ¶ 1, 831 N.W.2d at 20.
22. Id. ¶ 8, 831 N.W.2d at 21.
23. Id.
24. Id. ¶ 9.
25. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8 guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
26. Courts often state that warrants are preferred. In cases where there is no warrant, the
burden of proving the search’s validity is on the government.
27. Probable cause arises when “the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is
being committed.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
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the “facts and circumstances relied on by the magistrate would warrant a
person of reasonable caution to believe the contraband . . . will be found in
the place to be searched.”28 The North Dakota Supreme Court uses a
totality of the circumstances approach in determining whether information
presented to a magistrate was sufficient to establish probable cause. 29
Specifically, the court has found that probable cause is “the sum total of
layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what
they know, and what they observed as trained officers.”30 The Court has
declared that the standard for probable cause “does not require the
commission of the offense be established with absolute certainty, or proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and may even be less than a preponderance of
the evidence.”31
There are a number of ways to establish probable cause, including
personal observations, hearsay, and a combination of the two, which is
known as corroboration.32 The North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure
allow for a probable cause finding to be “based upon hearsay evidence in
whole or in part.”33 Hearsay used to establish probable cause may come
from a named or unnamed informant.34 In North Dakota, police officers
and ordinary citizens are presumed to be reliable, while the credibility of a
person from “criminal milieu” must be established.35
Federal law recognizes that a source’s veracity may be reinforced by
independent police verification where it was initially insufficient, and the
source’s basis of knowledge may be reinforced by verified details.36 While
the sources of information in the affidavit can vary, the four corners rule37
establishes that a reviewing court cannot consider anything not in the
warrant, affidavit, or recorded testimony when considering probable

28. State v. Nelson, 2005 ND 59, ¶ 3, 693 N.W.2d 910, 913.
29. Holly, ¶ 12, 833 N.W.2d at 22.
30. State v. Guthmiller, 2002 ND 116, ¶ 10, 646 N.W.2d 724, 728.
31. State v. Spidahl, 2004 ND 168, ¶ 11, 686 N.W.2d 115, 118.
32. North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 is an adaptation of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41 and implements the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1,
section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution.
33. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)(c).
34. A confidential informant is a person known to the police, but whose identity is
concealed from the magistrate. State v. Roth, 2004 ND 23, ¶ 11, 674 N.W.2d 495, 500.
35. State v. Boushee, 284 N.W.2d 423, 430 (N.D. 1979).
36. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969).
37. “In making this independent determination as to the existence of probable cause, the
reviewing court may not look beyond the four corners of the affidavit or application for issuance
of the warrant.” State v. Schmalz, 2008 ND 27, ¶ 13, 744 N.W.2d 734, 738.
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cause.38 After a probable cause finding has been made, a reviewing court
gives great deference to the issuing court’s determination.39
A. SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN NORTH DAKOTA
Most search and seizure related issues are addressed by statute or
rule.40 In general, North Dakota requires search warrants to be served
within ten days of issuance. In addition, warrants must be served during the
daytime hours of 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., unless a magistrate authorizes an
anticipatory or nighttime warrant.41
1. Nighttime Execution: When Law Enforcement Needs Separate
Probable Cause
The North Dakota Supreme Court was first presented with the issue of
nighttime service of a search warrant in State v. Schmeets.42 Schmeets was
charged with the possession of a controlled substance after law enforcement
found cocaine in his residence during a search conducted pursuant to a
warrant.43 Schmeets sought to suppress the evidence on the grounds that
the search warrant lacked probable cause and had been executed at night in
violation of Rule 41(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.44
The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Schmeets appealed the
conviction.45 On review, the North Dakota Supreme Court articulated that
the purpose of Rule 41(c) “is to protect citizens from being subjected to the
trauma of unwarranted nighttime searches.”46 The court acknowledged that
the form on which the warrant in Schmeets was drafted created confusion
regarding the specific time for execution.47 Ultimately, however, the court
declined to rule on the issue, having already found the warrant invalid due
to insufficient probable cause.48

38. See generally State v. Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1979).
39. State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, ¶ 11, 833 N.W.2d 15, 22.
40. Specifically, criminal procedure rules are addressed by North Dakota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.
41. North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c) provides: “The warrant shall be served
in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for
reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime.” N.D. R. CRIM. P.
41(c).
42. Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d at 404.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 410.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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In State v. Fields,49 the North Dakota Supreme Court found a violation
in the execution of a nighttime search warrant.50 Looking to Rule 41(c)(1),
the court considered whether the magistrate had adequate probable cause
for authorizing a nighttime search of Fields’s home.51 The court reiterated
that probable cause for a nighttime search “exists upon a showing that the
evidence sought may be quickly and easily disposed of, and . . . drugs are
such evidence.”52 The court found the facts insufficient to support the
government’s argument that the defendant’s odd hours and propensity for
violence constituted sufficient probable cause for nighttime execution, and
suppressed the evidence.53 Perhaps most importantly, this case resulted in
an overruling of the per-se rule justifying the issuance of nighttime search
warrants in drug cases.54
In another post-conviction case, Roth v. State,55 the North Dakota
Supreme Court again addressed a challenge based on the authorization of a
nighttime search.56 The district court had not decided whether there was
probable cause for a nighttime search.57 On review, the majority found that
there were adequate facts to support the necessary probable cause for a
nighttime search where the defendant was likely to be cooking
methamphetamine during nighttime hours, as shown by law enforcement’s
surveillance of the defendant’s activities.58 The majority also noted in dicta
that the good-faith exception would also apply in this case.59 However, the
Roth decision was not unanimous, and Justice Maring’s dissent expressed
her belief that there was neither probable cause nor a good-faith
exception.60
2. Open Fields and Plain View Doctrine: When Law
Enforcement Does Not Need Probable Cause
Since the Fourth Amendment protections are limited to “persons,
houses, papers, and effects,” they do not apply where contraband is
49. 2005 ND 15, 691 N.W.2d 233.
50. Id. ¶ 1, 691 N.W.2d at 234.
51. North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)(1) requires the issuing magistrate find a
sufficient showing of probable cause to justify the authorization of a nighttime search. N.D. R.
CRIM. P. 41(c)(1).
52. Fields, ¶ 10, 278 N.W.2d at 237.
53. Id. ¶ 14, 278 N.W.2d at 238.
54. Id. ¶ 10, 278 N.W.2d at 237.
55. 2007 ND 112, 735 N.W.2d 882.
56. Id. ¶ 1, 735 N.W.2d at 882.
57. Id. ¶16, 735 N.W.2d at 890.
58. Id. ¶ 27, 735 N.W.2d at 892-93.
59. Id. ¶ 30, 735 N.W.2d at 893.
60. Id. ¶ 36, 735 N.W.2d at 895.
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observed in an open field.61 At common law, open fields include anything
outside of the home or curtilage.62 The rationale for this doctrine lies in
language of the Fourth Amendment and case law emphasizing society’s
reasonable expectations of privacy.63 Similarly, the plain view doctrine
allows items that are evidence of a crime to be seized without a warrant
when they are in plain view of a law enforcement officer who is standing
inside a constitutionally protected area.64
B. APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN NORTH DAKOTA
The exclusionary rule operates to suppress evidence where there has
been a constitutional violation.65 States courts, which find violations of
rules and statutes, may or may not suppress evidence. As a general rule,
North Dakota does not use exclusionary remedies for statutory violations.66
Violations of rules, such as Rule 41, are not required to have suppression
remedies, but the North Dakota Supreme Court has suppressed evidence
where it has found rule violations, generally without discussion about
whether an exclusionary sanction is required.67

61. The Fourth Amendment of United States Constitution states the right of the people to be
“secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be search, and the persons or things to be
seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62. Curtilage is considered to be the land immediately surrounding and associated with the
home. The curtilage “is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the
‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886).
63. The United States Supreme Court has found no illegal search where law enforcement
installed a microphone to the outside of a public telephone booth because there was no physical
penetration of the booth and because the defendant could have no reasonable expectation of
privacy speaking at a public telephone booth. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
64. In Horton v. California, law enforcement had probable cause to search a home for
evidence of a robbery. 496 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1990). The warrant neglected to list potential
weapons, which law enforcement found in plain view while searching for proceeds of the robbery.
Id. at 131. The majority found the plain view doctrine applied because law enforcement was not
searching beyond its authorization when it found the weapons. Id. at 142.
65. There are multiple suppression rules, including the Fourth Amendment guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
66. But see Kuntz v. State Highway Comm’r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 290 (N.D. 1987) (finding a
“qualified” statutory right for defendant to consult with attorney before making chemical test
decisions in a DUI driver’s license case.”).
67. Following United States Supreme Court precedent, the North Dakota Supreme Court
generally applies exclusionary remedies where it finds a violation of the state constitution. See
State v. Lunde, 2008 ND 142, ¶ 15, 752 N.W.2d 630, 636.
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The Good-Faith Exception

The United States Supreme Court developed the reasonable good-faith
exception as an exception to the exclusionary rule when the costs of
exclusions outweigh the benefits.68 The rationale behind the exception is
that no deterrence purposes are served where a police officer who
objectively, and in good faith, obtains and executes a warrant that is later
found to be invalid.69 North Dakota adopted the good faith exception in
State v. Herrick,70 but avoided its application under the North Dakota
Constitution.71 The court found that police officers acted in objectively
reasonable reliance on a no-knock warrant issued by a judge.72 In the
dissent, Justice Maring emphasized her view that the court should have
directly addressed the good faith exception as it applies to the state
Constitution, and Justice Maring cited North Dakota cases relying upon the
state constitution.73
North Dakota recognizes the four federally recognized exceptions to
the good-faith doctrine.74 The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that
an officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s authorization is not reasonable
where:
(1) the issuing magistrate was misled by false information
intentionally or negligently given by the affiant; (2) when the
magistrate totally abandoned her judicial role and failed to act in a
neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant was based on
an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable;’ and (4) when
a reasonable law enforcement officer could not rely on a facially
deficient warrant.75
2.

The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine

Another federal exception to the exclusionary rule recognized in North
Dakota is the inevitable discovery doctrine.76 In State v. Phelps,77 the
68. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
69. Id. at 921-22.
70. 1999 ND 1, 588 N.W.2d 847.
71. Id. ¶ 27, 588 N.W.2d at 852.
72. Id. ¶ 20, 588 N.W.2d at 851.
73. Id. ¶ 52, 588 N.W.2d at 856.
74. Id. ¶ 15, 588 N.W.2d at 850.
75. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)).
76. The inevitable discovery doctrine allows the government the opportunity to prove that
law enforcement would have discovered the illegally obtained evidence regardless of the illegal
search or seizure. State v. Smith, 2005 ND 21, ¶ 31, 691 N.W.2d. 203, 212.
77. 287 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1980).
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North Dakota Supreme Court examined evidence derived from information
that was obtained through an illegal search. The court held that the
evidence would not be inadmissible if the police had not acted in a bad-faith
effort to accelerate the discovery of the evidence and if the evidence would
have been discovered despite the illegal activity.78
In order for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply, the state must
meet a two-prong test.79 First, the court stated, “use of the doctrine is
permitted only when the police have not acted in bad faith to accelerate the
discovery of the evidence in question,” and next, “the State must prove that
the evidence would have been found without the unlawful activity and must
show how the discovery of the evidence would have occurred.”80 In
Phelps, the state submitted photographs of the defendant to illustrate what
police officers observed about the defendant prior to the illegal search.81
This proved that the officers were aware of the defendant’s wounds,
regardless of the search of his clothes.82
In State v. Johnson,83 a deputy sheriff seized an air compressor without
a warrant believing it to be stolen property.84 The district court denied
Johnson’s motion to suppress based on unlawful seizure, stating it found no
reasonable expectation of privacy in Johnson’s driveway, where the item
had been located.85 Applying the two-prong test developed in Phelps, the
North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the inevitable discovery doctrine.86
The court found the state could not satisfy the first prong requiring law
enforcement to not have acted in bad faith in an effort to accelerate the
discovery of the evidence in question.87 With somewhat strong language,
the court found that “in no instance is this type of shortcut more apparent
than in [this] case in which the warrant requirement was bypassed in the
absence of exigent circumstances.”88

78. Id. at 775.
79. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 258 (Iowa 1979) (adopting a two-prong
inevitable-discovery theory similar to that of other states, as promoted in Professor LaFave’s
treatise, 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.4, at 622 (1978)).
80. Phelps, 287 N.W.2d at 775.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 301 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1981).
84. Id. at 626.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 629.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
Holly presented two issues: (1) whether the magistrate had sufficient,
separate probable cause for the issuance of a nighttime search of Holly’s
residence and vehicle; and (2) whether the evidence would be admissible
due to either the good-faith or inevitable discovery exceptions.89 Holly is
particularly interesting given the court found the nighttime execution of the
warrant to be invalid as applied to the home, but valid as applied to the car
outside.90 The court’s five justices were unable to write a unanimous
opinion on the facts of the Holly case, which discusses aspects of North
Dakota’s search and seizure law as it applies to law enforcement and
judiciary branches across the state.91
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Justice Maring92 began by addressing Holly’s
claim that the warrant affidavit failed to show sufficient separate probable
cause for authorizing a nighttime search. The court first looked to North
Dakota’s established case law. Following precedent, Justice Maring
acknowledged that the mere existence of drugs does not lead to an inference
that evidence will be easily disposed of.93 A law enforcement officer must
set forth facts for believing the evidence will be destroyed.94 Since Deputy
Graham testified that unsworn statements were used to request nighttime
execution of the warrant, the court relied only on the face of the affidavit
for determining whether probable cause existed.95
The search warrant in this case applied to Holly’s residence, persons at
the residence, and vehicle.96 The affidavit included that:
(1) Holly would be transporting marijuana and other unknown
prescription drugs in his white Ford Ranger; (2) Holly advised
Sesseman that he . . . would be leaving Whitefish, MT in the
morning hours of 2/8/2011 and expected to arrive in Minot during
the evening hours; (3) Holly was planning to purchase six pounds
of marijuana and some prescription drugs to bring back to Minot;
89. State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, ¶ 2, 833 N.W.2d 15, 20.
90. Id.
91. Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justice Kapsner concurred with the majority opinion.
Justice Crothers concurred in part and dissented in part, and Justice Sandstrom dissented from the
majority opinion.
92. Holly, ¶ 10, 833. N.W.2d at 21.
93. Id. ¶ 36, 833 N.W.2d at 26.
94. Id.
95. Id. ¶ 40, 833 N.W.2d at 28.
96. Id. ¶ 41.
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(4) [b]ased upon [Deputy Graham’s] training and experience
vehicles are often used for storage and hiding drugs related
paraphernalia; (5) Sesseman witnessed Holly smoking marijuana
in the residence; and (6) Deputy Graham observed a multi-colored
glass smoking device, commonly called a bong, sitting on a
dresser along the west wall of [Holly’s] bedroom through an open
door.97
Using a totality of the circumstances approach, Justice Maring wrote
that a “vehicle’s inherent mobility provides exigent circumstances to
reasonably infer that the illegal contraband would not be found again if law
enforcement must wait and procure a search warrant.”98 Therefore, the
separate probable cause necessary for nighttime execution of a search of
Holly’s vehicle existed on the face of the affidavit.99 Distinguishing Roth,
however, the majority opinion held that the warrant affidavit “did not
contain particularized facts indicating the need to apprehend and search
Holly’s residence at the time of the alleged commission of the crime”
because it lacked information indicating that the evidence would be
destroyed prior to daytime.100
The majority opinion rejected the state’s argument that the good faith
exception should apply in regards to the nighttime search of Holly’s
residence.101 Instead, the majority found the good-faith exception102 did not
apply because “a reasonably well-trained officer would know that this
nighttime search warrant, which lacked in indicia of probable cause that the
contraband would be easily destroyed or quickly removed from the
residence, was invalid.”103 In addition, the majority declined to apply the
inevitable discovery doctrine.104 The court found that the state had failed to
prove law enforcement had not acted in bad faith when it disregarded search
warrant procedure to accelerate the discovery of evidence.105

97. Id. (quotations omitted).
98. Id. ¶ 43.
99. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 47, 833 N.W.2d at 29-30.
101. Id. ¶ 52, 833 N.W.2d at 31.
102. An officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s authorization is not objectively reasonable,
and suppression remains appropriate: “when the warrant was based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” Id. ¶
50, 833 N.W.2d at 30.
103. Id. ¶ 52, 833 N.W.2d at 31.
104. Id. ¶ 56, 833 N.W.2d at 33.
105. Id. ¶ 61, 833 N.W.2d at 34.
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B. JUSTICE CROTHERS’ CONCURRENCE IN PART AND
DISSENT IN PART
Justice Crothers disagreed with the majority’s opinion as it applied to
the inevitable discovery doctrine and the suppression of evidence.106
Justice Crothers first looked to the language of the Fourth Amendment and
noted “[t]he Amendment does not address execution of warrants at night,
and we must be guided by precedent to decide whether a particular search
was lawful.”107 In addition, Justice Crothers stressed that the majority of
the court agreed that the authorized warrant was valid in light of the Fourth
Amendment.108 Rather than finding Officer Graham’s actions to be in bad
faith, Justice Crothers reflected that Officer Graham was “[o]bviously
mindful that execution of search warrants at night need explicit
authorization” and sought and received judicial approval of such a
search.109
Justice Crothers reflected on the facts of Holly with a broad perspective
when he wrote:
Judicial authorization was received at the same time for nighttime
execution of both the home and the vehicle warrants.
Authorization for nighttime execution of neither warrant was
supported by a showing of “separate probable cause.” Yet we
uphold the nighttime vehicle search based on the recognized
exigency that vehicles are inherently mobile and the suspected
contraband “would not be expected to be in Holly’s vehicle the
following day or might be removed if the search was delayed to
daytime.”110
Justice Crothers also analyzed how the rationale for limiting nighttime
searches applied to the facts of the case.111 For example, Justice Crothers
noted that Holly and Holly’s girlfriend were seized immediately upon their
arrival, which happened to be fourteen minutes later than the “inflexible,
one size fits all, rule crafted by this Court that ‘daytime’ ends at 10:00
p.m.”112 Since it was clear that neither Holly nor his girlfriend were asleep

106. Id. ¶ 79, 833 N.W.2d at 37.
107. Id. ¶ 80.
108. Id. ¶ 81.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶ 82, 883 N.W.2d at 38 (internal citations omitted).
111. Id. ¶ 83. Typically, restricting the execution of search warrants to specific “daytime”
hours is done so as a safety precaution; there is inherent risk for law enforcement in nighttime
searches, when a homeowner has likely been sleeping and is particularly vulnerable. State v.
Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401, 410 (N.D. 1979).
112. Holly, ¶ 83, 883 N.W.2d at 38 (citation omitted).
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at the time the warrant was executed, and it was unlikely that Sesseman, the
remaining roommate, was asleep “during execution of the warrants that his
information and participation helped procure,” the rationale behind
avoiding nighttime execution of a warrant was not served by the exclusion
of evidence found in Holly’s residence.113
Those additional facts, Justice Crothers noted, are particularly
important in determining the applicability of the good-faith and inevitable
discovery doctrines.114 Justice Crothers stated that he was compelled to
agree that Officer Graham’s failure to establish separate probable cause to
search the residence may not have been in good faith.115 Justice Crothers
continued, however, by explaining that he did not agree with “the
majority’s apparent leap from the lack of good faith under the good faith
exception to a determination of bad faith under the inevitable discovery
doctrine.”116 The test for the inevitable discovery doctrine, Justice Crothers
explained, is the presence of bad faith, rather than the absence of good
faith.117 Since the search of both Holly’s vehicle and residence would have
been legal and in good-faith during daytime hours, Justice Crothers argued
that the record did not support a conclusion that law enforcement’s actions
were accomplished with bad faith when they occurred fourteen minutes
late.118
C. JUSTICE SANDSTROM’S DISSENT
In dissent, Justice Sandstrom also began his analysis by looking to the
language of the Fourth Amendment.119 Citing the United States Supreme
Court, Justice Sandstrom emphasized that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness.”120 With this touchstone in mind, Justice
Sandstrom wrote:
The magistrate had determined there was probable cause to believe
drugs and other evidence were inside the house, so once the search
of the vehicle began in the driveway, one of two things was going
to happen—those inside the house were going to remove or

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. ¶ 84.
Id. ¶ 85.
Id.
Id. ¶ 87, 883 N.W.2d at 39.
Id. ¶ 90.
Id. ¶ 92, 833 N.W.2d at 39-40.
Id. (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).
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destroy the drugs and other evidence, or, as Justice Crothers
concludes, they were inevitably going to be discovered.121
Justice Sandstrom continued by referencing the Chief Justice’s
concurrence in State v. Fields,122 which distinguished between the rejected
per-se presumption that drugs are easily disposed of as it applies to
no-knock violations and as it applies to nighttime execution of search
warrants.123 The Chief Justice wrote that “evidence that a subject of a
search warrant consumed or delivered drugs within a few hours of their
receipt or made deliveries in the nighttime hours would justify issuance of a
nighttime search warrant.”124
Emphasizing reasonableness, Justice
Sandstrom advocated that “the high risk of destruction of the drugs in the
house while the vehicle was being searched in the driveway provides the
touchstone of reasonableness of the nighttime search warrant here.”125
IV. IMPACT
Both judiciary and law enforcement in North Dakota are impacted by
the Holly decision. Law enforcement, prosecutors, and magistrates will not
be able to use either the good faith exception, or inevitable discovery
doctrine, as a remedy to the exclusionary rule where a search warrant
executed through nighttime service was not supported by separate probable
cause. The North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision warns warrant
applicants and authorizers alike that what constitutes sufficient probable
cause to search a premises at night can vary even in cases where the
defendant, contraband, and location are the same. The Holly decision
serves to emphasize to North Dakota’s law enforcement that they will be
held to a strict standard in cases where they seek to search for or seize
evidence. Although the good faith exception can apply where a defendant’s
claim is based on the federal constitution, the North Dakota Supreme Court
has not explicitly held that the same exception applies to the state
constitution.126 As the court has stated, it is “axiomatic (that) our state
constitution may provide greater protections than its federal counterpart.”127
The Holly decision reflects the court’s view that separate and adequate
probable cause for a nighttime search must be strictly enforced. The strict
interpretation of nighttime search requirements may serve to narrow law
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
2005 ND 15, ¶ 18, 691 N.W.2d 233, 238.
Id. ¶ 93, 833 N.W.2d at 40.
Fields, ¶ 18, 691 N.W.2d at 239.
Holly, ¶ 94, 833 N.W.2d at 40.
State v. Lunde, 2008 ND 142, ¶¶ 17, 19, 752 N.W.2d 630, 636-37.
State v. Herrick, 1999 ND 1, ¶ 22, 588 N.W.2d 847, 851.
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enforcement’s ability to use them. In fact, the Holly decision and those
following it may actually serve to blur the lines between a nighttime
warrant and a no-knock warrant. Recently, Justice Sandstrom noted his
view that the North Dakota Supreme Court “has gotten off track in equating
nighttime search warrants with no-knock search warrants in drug cases.”128
Looking to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Sandstrom found that “equating nighttime searches with no-knock searches
[. . .] is misplaced. What [the North Dakota Supreme Court has] done by
opinion [it] can undo by opinion. And I would do so.”129
A. “REASONABLENESS” UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
As Justice Sandstrom explained, the Holly decision further defines
what North Dakota recognizes as a reasonable search pursuant to the state
constitution.130 While Justice Sandstrom expressed his view that the search
in Holly was a reasonable one, the majority of the court sent the message to
North Dakota law enforcement that it is in fact unreasonable for an officer
or a judge to rely on an anytime warrant lacking in separate probable cause
as it applies to a suspect’s place of residence.131 Whether it is a
constitutional requirement for warrants to be served during the “daytime”
hours of 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. may be interpreted differently from state to
state. For example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found there was no
constitutional violation where the defendant is not at home during the
search.132 Perhaps a traditional, textual interpretation of the constitution
would focus less on the exact time of execution and instead consider the
“reasonableness” of the search in its entirety. More broadly, the Holly case
leaves us to wonder if it is unreasonable to execute a search warrant
fourteen minutes late, and if suppression of the evidence is the correct
remedy.

128. State v. Zeller, 2014 ND 65, ¶ 29, 845 N.W.2d 6, 15 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). The
goal of North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), to protect citizens from the trauma of
unwarranted nighttime searches, is no longer necessary. The reality is that “[w]e are no longer a
sleepy village where television goes off the air at 11 or 12, and every business is shut down during
the night. Today people work around the clock. The drug culture appears to be particularly alive
at night.” Id.
129. Id.
130. Holly, ¶ 92, 833 N.W.2d at 40.
131. Id.
132. State v. Jordan, 726 N.W.2d 534, 541 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d in State v. Jordan,
742 N.W.2d 149, 151 (Minn. 2007).
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B. DISTINGUISHING ROTH V. STATE
In North Dakota’s brief, the government contended that Holly was
analogous to Roth.133 In Roth, the court found probable cause to support the
nighttime execution of a warrant where it was likely that Roth would be
manufacturing methamphetamine during the night.134 In order for law
enforcement to establish Roth’s role in the manufacturing process, the
search needed to be conducted during those hours.135 The state alleged that,
similar to the Roth case, law enforcement in the Holly case needed to
execute the warrant at the actual time of Holly’s arrival in order to more
effectively establish his role in the transport and delivery of the drugs. 136 If
law enforcement had done otherwise, the government stated, “evidence
indicating that Holly had brought illegal substances back from Whitefish,
Montana would not have been as convincing, and further, left open
questions relating to the reliability of the reporting party.”137
The North Dakota Supreme Court did not agree with the government’s
position.138 Officer Graham’s affidavit stating that Holly and his girlfriend
were transporting drugs into North Dakota and were expected to arrive in
the evening hours was not sufficient to establish the separate probable cause
needed for nighttime execution, because the information was not provided
to the magistrate under sworn testimony.139 The Court distinguished Holly
by stating that, unlike Roth, “the warrant affidavit did not contain
particularized facts indicating the need to apprehend and search Holly’s
residence at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.”140 The Court
does not disclose whether those facts, had they been included in sworn
testimony, would have been sufficient for nighttime execution.
V. CONCLUSION
In Holly, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that without a separate
showing of probable cause, law enforcement cannot rely on the good-faith
exception or the inevitable discovery doctrine where there is nighttime
service of a search warrant.141 While this ruling clarifies North Dakota’s
two-prong application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, it remains
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Brief for Appellee at 7, State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, 833 N.W.2d 15 (No. 20120324).
Roth v. State, 2007 ND 112, ¶ 27, 735 N.W.2d 882, 892.
Id.
Holly, ¶ 46, 833 N.W.2d at 29.
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 133, at 7.
Holly, ¶ 47, 833 N.W.2d at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1, 833 N.W.2d at 20.
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unclear under what circumstances North Dakota will recognize a good-faith
exception. Holding that law enforcement could not have believed a search
of Holly’s home to be reasonable, but finding the vehicle search valid, the
Holly decision may contribute to confusion amongst North Dakota’s law
enforcement regarding what is a reasonable search pursuant to the North
Dakota Constitution.
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